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Abstract
ANN KIRKPATRICK JACOBS:
Turkey and the European Union: Why Europe Doesn't Want a Taste of Turkey
(Under the direction of Dr. Ahmet Yukleyen)

This thesis examines the debate surrounding Turkey’s accession into the
European Union, namely the allegation by some scholars that there has been a shift in the
type of opposition against Turkey during recent years. Its goal is to examine tlie reasons
why this shift occurred and it focuses on France as a specific country in which a shift in
opposition has occurred. In the first chapter, it analyzes editorials published in the two
most important French newspapers, Le Monde and Le Figaro, alongside the context of
the simultaneously occurring external and political events, in order to prove that the shift
occurred. In order to find out why the shift occurred, it looks at the European identity:
what factors throughout history have gone into its creation, and how it has been
challenged by the possibility of Turkey becoming a member of the European Union.
Lastly, it examines how the growing presence of Islam within Europe as a result of
Muslim immigration has caused conservative Europeans to become even more closeminded towards the idea of a multicultural Europe and how this has affected their
perceptions of Turkey. It concludes that a shift did occur, and that the reasons explored
were very significant in causing it, and makes some overall conclusions regarding the
future of Turkey’s EU accession and what changes need to take place within Europe in
order for it to occur.

IV

Table of Contents

I. Introduction

1

II. Media and Politics

13

III. European Identity

33

IV. Muslim Immigrants in Europe

54

V. Conclusion

69

VI. Appendix

73

VII.

74

Bibliography

V

INTRODUCTION:

During my semester abroad in Nantes, France last spring, I was privileged to have
an amazing class on politics in the Middle East, which was taught by one of the most
enthusiastic professors I have ever been instmcted by. She had spent a large amount of
time in the Middle East, spoke Arabic, and had a very deep understanding of the politics
of the region, and her enthusiasm was contagious. For nearly fom hours every Thursday,
we were her audience as she enlightened us on the politics, culture, and history of the
Middle East. One topic of conversation that came up not only in this class, but in others
as well was the subject of Turkey’s EU aspirations. I knew very little on the subject
initially, but the more I heai'd about it in class, as well as from my very conservative host
family, the more engaging the subject became. The harsh opinions of most of these
French citizens towards Turkey’s cause really caught my attention and made me want to
learn more, and thus my decision to explore the topic in my senior thesis.

Turkey has been trying to become a part of Europe for well over half a century.
Its membership in the European Community(EC) was initially turned down in 1987 for
socio-economic and political reasons, such as human rights issues and the lack of a true
democracy.' However, after much work and despite numerous setbacks, Turkey reached
the early 2C‘ century with impressive, monumental reforms of its economy,judicial
system, and government that almost completely complied with the European Union(EU)
criteria as laid out in the Copenhagen Criteria in 1993. Turkey's good progress was

Carkoglu, Ali. and Barry Rubin. Turkey and the European Union: Dome.stic Policies. Economic
Integration, and International Dynamics. Frank Ca.ss and Co. Ltd. Portland. Oregan - 200.^. 149-150.

rewarded by being granted candidacy in 2004, with negotiations for membership set
to begin in 2005."
However, four years later, nearly no progress has been achieved in the
membership negotiations between Turkey and the EU. It seems that the tides have
changed within the EU, where former leaders such as Jacques Chirac of France were
once very supportive, but with the election of new leaders such as Nicolas Sarkozy, who
publicly opposed Turkey’s EU membership in his presidential campaign, has come more
opposition from within. Despite the considerable progress Turkey has made in meeting
the socio-economic requirements of the Copenhagen Criteria, many conservative
Europeans, such as the French who sympathize with the extremely conservative Front
Nationale and those Germans who sympathize with the far-right Republikaner Party, are
starting to cite differences in culture, religion, history, and geography as reasons why
Turkey should not be allowed to join the EU.'^ These reasons can all be grouped under
the category of cultural differences. It seems that there has been a shift in conservative
Europeans’ opposition of Turkey’s EU accession from socio-economic and political
reasons to reasons involving cultural differences.*^
This shift has been acknowledged by scholars such as Nilufer Gole and Elizabeth
Shakman Hurd. Gole, in her article “Europe - an identity or a project?” has identified the
shift as having taken place in 2002, and cites discussions involving geography, religion,
and cultural differences as new arguments against Turkey that began to develop at that
" Kosebalaban, Hasan."The Permanent ‘Other?’ Turkey and the Question of European Identity."
Mediterranean Quarterly 18:4. 2007. Mediterranean Affairs.
Lebor. Adam. A Heart Turned East: Among the Muslims of Europe and America. St. Martin's Press,
New York. 1997. 169, 196.
Hurd, Elizabeth. "Negotiating Europe: the politics of religion and the prospects for Turkish accession."
Review ofInternational Studies. 32. 2006. British International Studies As.wciation. 401-418. Also, see
Gt)le. Nilufer. "Europe - an identity or a project?" 15 December 2005. v\u\v.siunandsi»zht.ct)in.
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lime. She also refers to the Turkey issue as being the “catalyst” for the crisis of
European identity. She wrote that it had an important part in that identity because it
served as the ‘other’ from which the European identity has traditionally been made
distinct.^
In her academic publication “Negotiating Europe: the politics of religion and the
prospects for Turkish accession,” Hurd also discusses how the European identity, which,
according to her, many conservative Europeans believe to be based on Christian heritage,
has been jeopardized by the possibility of Turkey’s becoming a member of the EU. She
attributes the shift to being based upon issues that can all be tied together because of
religion.^
It is this shift in the type of opposition that has caused the debate surrounding
Turkey’s potential accession into the EU to become so heated and controversial. This
thesis aims examine the reasons for this shift to understand tliese reasons and the
resulting implications on the likelihood of Turkey’s EU accession.

Turkey’s journey towards gaining admission into the EU has been a long and
arduous one that officially began in 1959 when Turkey first submitted its application to
become a member of the European Economic Community, however it could be argued
that the process began long before. The territory that is today known as Turkey has been
a part of many great civilizations, existing back into the ancient times. It was a part of
the Roman Empire, then the Byzantine Empire, and finally the Ottoman Empire starting
in the 14‘*^ century. For centuries, Muslim culture had a powerful and important presence

^ Gole, 2
Hurd, 402-406

3

in what is today known as the Middle East as well as in Europe. It was a center of
culture and knowledge in the arts and sciences while Europe was going through the
period known as the Dark Ages, and its culture and knowledge was inherited by the
Ottoman Empire.^ However, as Europe began to emerge into the Renaissance and the
Enlightenment, the Ottoman Empire began to decline. By the late 19 and early 20
centuries, the Ottoman Empire had begun to unravel. During the First World War. the
Ottoman Empire chose to align itself with Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire,
causing it to end up on the losing side at the end of the war. From 1919-1923, the Turks
waged the War of Liberation, during which they became independent of the Allyoccupied former Ottoman Empire. During this period, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk rose

to

power, helping to create the Republic of Turkey, and eventually becoming its founder
and first president.^ Although difficult at first, these reforms began to become ingrained
in Turkish society.
Once these reforms began to take hold in Turkish society, it began to look
towards Europe as a way to solidify these reforms in its society. Ataturk, as he came to
be called, made numerous reforms within Turkish society so it could become more
Western. He used the French kiicite as a model for complete separation of religion and
the state. He also abolished the sultanate that had been in power for over 600 years, and
he established a representative democracy that was based on the Western model. He
made considerable societal reforms, such as the abolishment of headscarves and hats,
which traditionally separated people by class and religion. He also introduced a more
Western style of clothing into Turkish society. He made reforms in education, which
^ Kosebalaban, 98-99
^ Kramer, Heinz. A Changing Turkey: The Challenge to Europe and the United States. The Brookings
Institute, 2000. 24-36.
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were a continuation of the educational reforms started during the

century by the

Ottomans, by introducing the Western alphabet and by opening schools at which all
Turkish people could leam"^.
Ataturk's "Westernization Project” was aimed at Turkey’s eventually becoming
an

official part of "Europe.” After World War II, the Western European countries created

the European Economic Community(EEC)in order to prevent another war between the
10

European nation-states,

In 1959, Turkey applied for membership, but was not

immediately accepted. After a few years, the EEC presented a customs agreement, which
was signed in 1963 and called the Ankara Agreement. From 1963 to 1987, Turkey
continued to try to strengthen its democracy and maintain the separation of religion and
the State. It encountered many problems, with the military being forced to intervene on
several occasions (1960, 1971, and 1980) in order to maintain this separation of religion
and state. There was also the controversy surrounding the island of Cypms, which was
invaded by Turkey in order to protect the Turkish citizens who lived there, but which was
viewed by many Europeans as encroachment on the Greek part of the island. The
situation is a very controversial one, but one that nevertheless plays a role in the debate
surrounding Turkey’s EU accession from the European point of view,

In 1987, Turkey

applied for membership in the European Community(EC), but was turned down because
there were too many objections to its economy and government. When the Soviet Union
fell in 1989, all thoughts about the potential of Turkey’s membership were pushed aside,
as the EU began to focus on the former Soviet-bloc nations, whose history and geography
^ Karpat. Kemal H."The Transformation of the Ottoman State. 1789-1908." International Journal of
Middle East Studies. Vol 3. No 3. July 1972. 243-281. Also, see Kramer. 24-36.
10

McCormick, John. The European Union. Westview Press. 2008. 60.
Tarifa. Fatos and Benjamin Adams."Who's the Sick Man of Europe? A Wavering EU Should Let
Turkey In.” Mediterranean Quarterly. 18:1.2007. Mediterranean Affairs. 54-.‘55
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made them ‘European/ even if their recent political situations were as anti12

‘European’ as possible.

At the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, the EC became the European

Union, and in 1993, it met at a summit in Copenhagen and agreed on three criteria for
membership that any potential candidate should meet. These criteria became knowm as
the Copenhagen Criteria and stated that any nation hoping to become a member of the
EU must:

1. Be democratic, with respect for human rights and the rule of law.
1

Have a functioning free market economy and the capacity to cope
with the competitive pressures of capitalism.

3. Be able to take on the obligations of the acquis commiinitaire.
which is the body of laws and regulations already adopted by the
13

EU.

During the 1990’s, Turkey made considerable reforms in order to comply with the
Copenhagen Criteria. With the election of Recep Tayyip Erdogan as Prime Minister in
2003, many sweeping reforms took place within Turkey. The death penalty was
abolished in 2002, and rights for women and minorities were further extended. He also
made efforts to contain the military and to improve Turkey’s economy.

Starting in

1999 after the Helsinki Summit, the European Commission published yearly reports on
Turkey’s progress, and by 2004, it determined that Turkey had, for the most part, met the

12
13

Fatos and Adams,55.
McCormick,92-93.

14

Gordon. Philip and Omer Taspinar. “Tiirkey'.s European Quest: The EU*s Decision on Turkish
Accession." U.S.-Europe Analysis Series. The Brookings Institution. September 2004.
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Copenhagen Criteria. The European Commission Progress Report of 2005
concluded that the Turkish government had made many reforms on its political system.
specifically on its legislative system, which had been recommended in the 2004 Report.
Changes were made in the civil-military relations that were more in line with the
democratic principles of the EU. The judicial system of Turkey was strengthened by the
creation and implementation of structural reforms. Anti-corruption measures had been
taken, although the report added that these measures could use some work in order to
become stronger. All of these measures were investigated and reported by European
Commission officials, who then presented the report to the Commission,from which
15

Turkey was granted status as candidate.

Negotiations for membership began in 2005,
16

with Turkey not projected to join until 2014-15.

During the years after the creation of

the Copenhagen Criteria, many European nations began to change their stances on
Turkey’s EU accession. The most notable change of opinion occurred in France, whose
leaders and citizens were mostly supportive of Turkey during the early to mid-1990's, but
who gradually became more opposed as the years wore on.

The reasons for opposition towards Turkey’s EU accession vary among different
groups of Europeans, but as a whole, they go much deeper than just whether or not it
meets the Copenhagen Criteria. When the European Community initially refused Turkey
in 1987, it was on the grounds of its economy, weak democracy, and human rights
17

issues.

These socio-economic reasons for opposition were made legitimate by the

15
16

The European Commission.'‘Turkey 2005 Progress Report." Brussels. 9 November 2005. 10-17
Kosebalaban. 103.

17

Carkoglu and Rubin, 149-150
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publication of the Copenhagen Criteria, and Turkey accepted the challenge to meet
the criteria in order to become an official member of the EU. However, over the course
of the 1990’s, Turkey made drastic reforms that resulted in growing closer to achieving
the Copenhagen Criteria. It is also important to note that Turkey’s economy has
consistently surpassed the economies of Bulgaria and Romania,two Eastern European
nations that w'ere admitted into the EU in 2007, since 1991, which can be seen in the
graph below.

GDP per capita (constant 2000 US $)
4,000
3,500
3,000
2,500

Turkey
Romania
Bulgaria

2,000
1,500
1,000
500
0
cO'

cv^ cP'
Years

Figure 1 Source: World Development Indicators 2007

As far as Human Rights are concerned, the 2005 Commission report states that
Turkey has made considerable progress with reforms in all areas, some more successful
than others. The death penalty was abolished in 2002, and there has been much progress
in guaranteeing freedom of the press. Also, the treatment of minority groups such as the

8

Kurds has improved, with Kurdish TV stations being allowed as well as with the
18

Kurdish language being taught in schools.
However, it seems that as Turkey grew closer to meeting the Copenhagen
Criteria, European oppositions seemed to become more closely tied to the European
identity itself and how Turkey’s membership would affect it than to any economic
shortcomings or inability to maintain a democratic government. In the late 1990’s public
discourse and newspaper editorials began to cite religious and cultural issues against
Turkey's EU membership rather than tlie traditional oppositions that were based on
failures to meet the Copenhagen Criteria. This mention of more cultural issues in
opposition of Turkey's EU accession began to become more prominent in both the media
and in popular discourse within Europe, and is especially true in the French media, which
will be explored in depth in the first chapter in order to pinpoint the change in type of
opposition and its effect on public opinion. Also, France seemed to be in favor of
19

Turkey’s EU accession when it did not seem likely to occur, i.e. from 1963-1990’s.
Former French President Jacques Chirac was known for being in favor of Turkey until it
seemed that the growing problems with Muslim immigrants, world events, and the
growing likelihood of Turkey’s success in meeting the Copenhagen Criteria were
20

changing the way in which the French public viewed Turkey’s EU accession.

The

conservative Nicolas Sarkozy was elected President of France in 2007 on a much more
conservative platform that included an anti-immigration stance and opposition to
Turkey’s EU accession. The election of such a conservative President is an important
IS

European Commission Report, 18-39
19

Duzgit. Senem Aydin. “Seeking Kant in the EU's Relations with Turkey." TESEV Puhlications.
Istanbul, Turkey. December 2006. 4
20
Drake, Helen. “Jacques Chirac's Balancing Acts: the French Right and Europe." South European Society
and Politics. Vol. 10. No. 2. July 2005. 305-307
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indicator in the change in sentiments towards Turkey that was taking place within
France during this time. This change in opinion that took place throughout Europe and
most notably in France, called a ‘shift’ by scholars such as Nilufer Gole and Elizabeth
Shakman Hurd, is what creates Turkey’s newest obstacle towards membership in the EU.
The question that arises is what are the reasons that caused this ‘shift’ to occur?
The goal of this thesis is to answer this question. It will be answered by looking at what
factors determine the European identity and how this affects Turkey’s status as the
‘other’ from which much of the European identity is based. The understanding of the
beliefs in what factors make up the European identity can then be applied to the impact of
the growing anxiety towards Muslim immigration within both France and the rest of
Europe. This is significant because of the feais of the growing reality of a multicultural
Europe and the resulting crisis of identity among Europeans affects the attitudes and
opinions of Europeans towards Turkey. The thesis will proceed in the following way, and
will conclude by showing how all of these factors have combined to both cause and then
strengthen this shift in type of opposition.
The first chapter will examine the media and politics in France during the time
period in which the shift occurred. It will begin by giving an overview of the political
situation in France starting with the election of Jacques Chirac as President in 1995 all
the way through to the election of Nicolas Sarkozy as President in 2007 as well as all of
the significant events that took place during this time. It will also examine surveys that
were taken within France during this time that specifically focus on the public’s opinions
concerning Turkey. The chapter will then examine editorials published in the two most
important French newspapers, the liberal Le Monde and the conservative Le Figaro, in

10

order to gauge the shift within France during this time. This analysis will be
presented alongside major events that took place either in France or in the rest of the
world that were key in shaping the content of the editorials that were published diu'ing the
same time period. Once all of this is done, it will be easy to see that a shift in opinion
indeed occuned.
Once the existence of the shift in opinion has been established by way of the
media and politics in France, it will be important to explore what caused this shift to
occur. Conservative Europeans, such as former French President Valery Giscard
21

d’Estaing have opposed Turkey on the basis that it is simply “not European.

The

question that then arises is “What does it mean to be ‘European’?” The second chapter
will attempt to answer this question. The necessity of the presence of a distinct ‘other’
from which one group can be derived in order for an identity to be formed, and how this
relates to the European identity will be explored initially. Because Turkey has
traditionally served as this ‘other,’ the possibility of Turkey becoming European, and
therefore taking on the identity of Europe, presents a challenge to what Europeans have
traditionally thought of as their identity and has resulted in an identity crisis within
Europe. This identity crisis has been further extended because of the growing reality of
Europe’s becoming a multicultural society as a result of immigration. Also, the EU’s
attempts at forging an official European identity in efforts to create a stronger union that
is based on common identification with the European Union as a whole rather than just
economic ties between separate nations will be factored into this analysis of the

21 .

'Ex-French President Snubs Turks on Union Bid.*' The New York Times. 9 November 2002
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implications of Europeans’ crisis of identity in the face of Turkey’s potential EU
accession.
The third chapter will contribute to answering the research question by addressing
the impact of growing anxieties about Muslim immigration within European societies and
how this has caused them to associate Turkey with the Muslim immigrants, as well as
how this affects their perceptions of the European identity. It will look specifically at
France, who has experienced much animosity among its citizens regarding immigration.
A special case of the Turkish expatriate community in Germany will also be examined to
see if the overall sentiments applied towards Muslim immigrants can be applied to
Turkish immigrants as well.
It is apparent that much is at stake concerning the Turkey/EU debate. The debate
on Turkey's EU accession has brought many weaknesses within the European Union as
well as within the European identity to the surface. It is a debate of whether to ‘widen’
the EU by allowing Turkey and other countries in, which would strengthen its economy
and ‘soft power’ status in the long run. However, those who wish to ‘deepen’ the EU
want it to remain an exclusive federation of European nations who are united through
their identity, and through their allegiance to a singular supranational government. It is
through the debate between these two schools of thought that the issue of Turkey has
become so controversial. Through the thorough examination of all aspects that construct
the opposition to Turkey’s EU accession it will become possible to understand the greater
significance of Turkey’s potential membership in the European Union.

12

MEDIA AND POLITICS CHAPTER
"Newspapers are the second hand of history."
Arthur Schopenhauer

Newspapers are an important part of the everyday lives of the citizens who read
them. They show what is going on in a certain nation, and give opinions on those events.
It is because of this that the use of newspapers in gauging the shift in type of opposition
towards Turkey's EU accession is important. France is a country in which a shift in type
of opposition appears to have taken place. Therefore, this chapter will use French
newspapers alongside the politics that were occurring simultaneously to gauge the shift in
opposition within France.
The situation in France regarding Turkey can be applied to the situation within
Europe as a whole because such a shift has taken place directly within France during the
last fifteen years. One way in which the shift within France can be seen is through
editorials written in France’s two leading newspapers, Le Monde and Le Figaro. These
two newspapers are published daily and read by people all over France. Le Monde is
traditionally more liberal, while Le Figaro is traditionally more conservative. In order
for the shift in opinion to be seen, it is necessary to look at editorials published in each
newspaper concerning Turkey and the EU from 1995 to 2008. It is also important to note
that access to editorials before 1997 in Le Figaro was not possible. The reason for the
use of these time periods is because Jacques Chirac's presidency began in 1995, and so

13

they span the length of his presidency as well as the rise to power and eventual
election of Nicolas Sarkozy as President of France. Also, they span the time from the
years just after the Copenhagen Criteria were agreed upon and released all the way to the
decision to give Turkey the status as an official EU candidate country in 2004. While the
context surrounding the time in which these editorials were written is an important part of
the analysis, what was written within the articles is significant as well.
The careful analysis of these editorials is a necessary component in understanding
how the media was both affected by and significant in the shift in type of opposition
towards Turkey's EU accession. The content of each editorial, as well as the context
surrounding the publication of each editorial as well as the newspaper in which it was
published will all be important factors in the analysis.

POLITICAL CONTEXT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS:

The political scenery in France during the span of the years covered by the
editorials is also a good way in which the attitudes towards Turkey can be gauged.
According to an academic study by Robert Andersen and Jocelyn Evans, there was a
distinct shift to the right in French politics during the late 1990’s and early 2000’s.
French President Jacques Chirac was an advocate of Turkey’s the entire time he was in
office, and during his last few years, the French public and even members of his own
party began to become vocal in their opposition towards Turkey."" Another publication
about the political discourse of Turkey within France by Bezya Cagaty Tekin stated that
the rise of the Right during Chirac's administration was a result of the “destruction of
Andersen, Robert and Jocelyn Evans."The Stability of French Political Space. 1988-2002.
Politics. Vol 3. 286-287.
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traditional community life, the transformation of industrial society, and the rise of
immigration.”"'^ This political shift to the Right within France is a key component in the
Turkey-EU debate because it is two-fold. On one side the possibility of Turkey’s
becoming a member of the EU and the resulting influx of Turkish immigrants made many
French people become more conservative in their views towards Turkey and towards
immigration in general. However, politicians also recognized this potential shift to the
right and fully exploited and encouraged it in order to gain votes. It is a mixture of these
two factors that took the shift to the public stage and made it an important factor in the
Turkey-EU debate within France.
In 2002, the shift to the right in French politics was consummated during the
French presidential elections. Jean Marie Le Pen, the candidate of the extreme right
Front Nationale(FN)reached the final mn-off in the presidential election between
himself and Jacques Chirac, thus causing the election take place between candidates of
the moderate and extreme Right. The fact that such a staunch conservative could be so
successful in the Presidential election proved that a shift to the right had indeed occurred.
Although Chirac did win the election, the extreme right has remained prominent on the
French political scene, forcing the moderate Right parties, such as the I’Union pour une
Democracie Francaise(UDF)and 1’Union pour un Mouvement Populaire(UMP), to
embrace much more conservative policies than before.""^ This is apparent in how public
officials such as Alain Juppe, the then president of the UMP and Nicolas Sarkozy, the
then Interior Minister of France as well as member of the UMP,became vocal in
Tekin, Bezya Cagaty."The construction of Turkey’s possible EU membership in French political
discourse." Discourse and Society. Vol. 19. No. 6, 2008. 731. Also see Drake, Helen.'‘Jacques Chirac s
Balancing Acts: the French Right and Europe" South European Society and Politics. Vol 10. No. 2. July
2005. 297-313
24

Anderson and Evans, 286-88

15

opposing Chirac’s support of Turkey.’^ It was also during this time that the UMP
and the public began to distance themselves from Chirac because of his supportive stance
towards Turkey. The issue of a referendum over the EU Constitution Treaty in 2005 was
also significant in the issue of Turkey, because the two were negatively associated by the
moderate and extreme Right in order to exploit the anti-immigrant feelings that were
26

stirring within conservative French circles, thus enabling them to gain votes.
It is no coincidence tliat Nicolas Sarkozy rose in power during the years in which
Jacques Chirac’s popularity and support were dwindling. Sarkozy's negative stance
towards Turkey put him in favor of tlie popular conservative sentiment that was found in
France during the early 2000’s. An interesting statistic found by an IFOP Poll conducted
for Vcileurs Actiielles in 2008 found that 68% of French people opposed to Turkey
becoming a member of the EU voted for Nicolas Sarkozy in the 2007 Presidential
elections and that 81% voted for Jean Marie Le Pen."^ This further reinforces the point
that a political shift to the right in French politics could be largely attributed to the
presence of a more conservative stance regarding immigration and Turkey’s EU
candidacy among the French. According to an academic study by Gilles Ivaldi, the
negative association of the EU Constitution to Turkey’s EU accession played a large role
in the negative views towards Turkey that were found among the French people. It is also
no coincidence that those negative views usually encompassed opposition based on
cultural terms. The study also claims that Sarkozy used his very public disdain for the EU

Drake. 306-308
Anderson and Evans. 287
27
IFOP for Valeurs Actuelles. *‘L'adhesion a Tentree de la Turquie dans 1‘Union Europeenne.” 18 August
2008.

26
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Constitution and Turkey’s EU accession to further his own political career.
Sarkozy stepped into the limelight in 2005 when he successfully passed a call for a
referendum on the EU Constitution Treaty at a UMP convention. He then became Prime
Minister, and was finally elected President in 2007.
The shift in type of opposition within France is also apparent in surveys taken
throughout the time period of the debate concerning Turkey’s EU accession. Although
there were no surveys conducted before 2004 within France that specifically addressed
the Turkey issue, all surveys conducted within France from 2004-on showed cultural
differences as reasons why the French opposed Turkey’s EU accession.
In 2004, a survey conducted by IFOP for Le Figaro showed that 67% of French
people were against Turkey’s EU accession, while only 32% were in favor. The top three
reasons given for opposition towards Turkey were human rights, cultural/ieligious
differences, and women’s rights.’^ In 2005, a Eurobarometer survey was published
which revealed that immigration and cultural differences were the most important reasons
for opposition aside from Turkey’s economy and human rights. The graph featured
below shows the responses of members of each EU nation when asked if Turkey should
not be allowed to join the EU because of reasons of cultural differences.

Ivaldi, Gilles. “Beyond France's 2005 Referendum on the European Constitutional Treaty: SecondOrder Model. Anti-Establishment Attitudes and the End of the Alternative European Utopia. West
European Politics. Vol. 29, No. 1. January 2006. 54.
29
IFOP for Le Figaro. “Les Europeens et la Turquie." 13 December 2004
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See Appendix A for detailed information by country.

It is also important to note that there was an entire section of the survey devoted
specifically to the Turkey issue, and that this was the first time that the Turkey-EU debate
became a specific focus within a Eurobarometer survey. This survey was also conducted
during the months after Turkey was granted official candidate country status because of
its successes at complying with the Copenhagen Criteria. The presence of opposition
based on cultural differences in these polls at this time further proves that a shift in the
type of opposition indeed occurred in France.
The knowledge and understanding of the political context in France during the
time in which the shift took place is very important in being able to understand the
analysis of the editorials published during that time. It is through the context ot external
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events that it is possible to understand the motives and attitudes behind each
editorial, and it is for this reason that such a large portion of this chapter was devoted to
the political context.

METHODOLOGY:

The attitudes and overall themes as well as the patterns found in each of the
editorials will be very important in gauging the shift in opinion. Whether the editorial
argues for or against Turkey’s accession will be very important in two ways. Firstly, it
will be important to note the newspaper in which these editorials were written because it
will show the opinion towards Turkey on both the conservative and liberal sides. The
second importance of the overall attitude of each editorial is the context surrounding each
article and how that context influenced what was written. The number and pattern of
each of these editorials arguing for or against Turkey in both newspapeis is also
significant because this pattern could be a direct way in which the shift can be gauged.
The overall theme of each editorial in relation to what is going on politically at
the same time is very significant because what was written in these editorials reflects
what was going on externally. The first part of the analysis will be set up chronologically
with editorials that will be presented alongside major events that occurred in the same
year. The major years and events that will be focused upon are: 1995, when Jacques
Chirac was elected President of France; 1999, when the Helsinki Summit occurred; 2001,
the year of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center; 2002, the year of Valery
Giscard d’Estaing’s infamous statement about the EU being a “Christian Club,” as well

19

as the French Presidential elections that took place between Jean Marie Le Pen and
Jacques Chirac: 2004/2005, the year in which Turkey was granted official EU candidate
status and also the year of the EU Constitution Referendum; and 2006/2007, when
Nicolas Sarkozy was elected President of France. It is these external events that inspired
editorials which either pleaded Turkey’s case before the French public or further negated
the idea of Turkey's EU accession.
The major theme that will be explored is that of culture, for it is the term aroimd
which the new type of opposition is based. The term culture, for the purposes of this
chapter, denotes any mention of religion, European identity, or geography in relation to
Turkey. Any mention whatsoever of these themes in relation to Turkey is significant,
whether they are used to argue in favor of or against it. Once the existence of these
culturally based themes is found in these articles, it will be necessary to note the years in
which they began to be mentioned. It will also be important to note how much of a role
the culture issues played in both opposing and advocating Turkey’s EU accession.
Newspapers are a great source to use when measuring the public opinion because
it is the public who reads the articles and editorials that are printed in newspapers and it is
that same public who writes letters to the editor in response to these articles and
editorials. Not only do these newspapers give an idea of what was going on in the world
at the time of Turkey’s attempts at EU accession, but they also give a good idea of the
opinions and ideas towards Turkey that were circulating in France during this time. It is
for this reason that they will be used in this chapter.

ANALYSIS:
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The analysis will begin with a brief overview of the overall attitudes and
themes of each newspaper. The results of the analysis of the editorials will then be
presented alongside the external events which occurred during the same time period. It
will then conclude with analysis of the presence and use of the culture argument to argue
for and against Turkey.

LE FIGARO:
In the Le Figaro editorials, the overall pattern was negative towards Turkey. In
as
1997, editorials were written against Turkey that cited religion, culture, and geography
reasons why it did not belong in Europe.'^ Such types of arguments continued
throughout the span of editorials, and they became more frequent as the years went by.
However, after 2004, when Turkey had been granted official candidate status, the
presence of opposition towards Turkey that was based on cultural reasons remained, but
began to fade into the background. In 2006, editorials began to be focused on how
attitudes had changed towards Turkey and how politicians were beginning to exploit this
shift towards more conservative sentiments towards Turkey and towards immigration in
general in order to win votes.

The eruption of a pattern like this in the conservative Le

Figaro shows the formation of the base of the conservative movement within France as
well as its potential implications on the French political system.

LE MONDE:
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Casanova. Jean-Claude. ”La Turquie en Europe?" Le Figaro. 19 February 1997.
Wallstrom. Margot."Non, I’Union n'est pas menacee d'un "peril turc." Le Figaro. 2 December 2006.
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In Le Monde, starting in 1995, the editorials began with more indifferent
attitudes towards Turkey. From 1995 to 1999, any editorials that mentioned Turkey were
positive towards its EU aspirations. One editorial in 1999 even went so far as to state that
Turkey was completely European and that it respected democracy and human rights.
From 1999-2002, however, Turkey was not mentioned very often in the editorial section.
2002 was the first year in the surveyed time period in which editorials were written that
were against Turkey’s EU accession. The next editorials written

that concerned Turkey

were published in 2004, and from then on all were in favor of Turkey becoming a
member of the EU. No more editorials were written concerning Turkey until 2008, wh
one was written by conseiwatives that argued against Turkey because of geography an
its economy, with a response by the socialists that completely discounted the arc,ume
made by the conservatives. However, tlie very presence

of such a conservative editorial

in Le Monde proves that the conservative movement had taken hold and even though the
editorial was almost immediately refuted by the Socialists, the fact that it even made it
into Le Monde shows that the conservative stance had gained strong footing within
France. Overall, the views in Le Monde towards Turkey were mostly positive, with a fe
negative ones that were scattered throughout. The issue was also not coveied as
extensively in Le Monde as in Le Figaro.

CHRONOLOGICAL ANALYSIS:
1995:

Tarschys. Daniel. “Le Conseil de I'Europe et I'Affaire Ocalan.” Le Monde. 12 March 1999.
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The year 1995 is a significant one in which to begin the analysis because it
was the year in w hich Jacques Chirac was elected President of France. In Le Monde, the
editorials that were published in 1995 were either in favor of or indifferent towards
Turkey's EU accession, but were not against it. However, none of them saw Turkey s
EU accession as something that was likely to happen any time soon. It is also important
to note that one editorial was written in which it explicitly stated that Europe supported
Turkey because it was not a Christian organization.^'^ These findings are important for
the analysis because they show that at one time, there was widespread support for
Turkey’s cause. This is evident in that there were no editorials published that refuted
these claims. However, it is also important to note that this may have been the case
because the event of Turkey’s EU accession was seen as very far off and unlikely to
occur any time soon.
1999;
1999 was the next year in which a major event took place that involved Turkey.
The Helsinki Summit, at which it was decided that yearly reports were to be published
before the European Commission on Turkey’s progress in achieving and implementing
the Copenhagen Criteria. This was the first year in the time periods featured in the
analysis in which both newspapers had an explosion of editorials concerning Turkey s
plight.
In Le Figaro, the editorials published in 1999 were oozing with references to
culture, used to argue both for and against Turkey. This is key, because the publication
of these editorials in the conservative French newspaper shows that these cultural issues

Un pas vers la Turquie.” Le Monde. 8 Febmary 1995.
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were stirring amongst those on the conservative side as early as 1999. In Le Monde,
it is important to note that from 1995 to 1999, any editorials that mentioned Turkey were
positive towards its EU aspirations. One editorial written by David Tarschys in 1999
even went so far as to state that Turkey was completely European and that it respected
34

democracy and human rights,

It is also important to note that up until this time, there

was no mention of culture, neither in support nor in opposition, in any editorial published
in Le Monde. This is significant because it shows that the use of culture in reference to
Turkey began on the Conservative side.
2001:
The next major external event that took place was the terrorist attacks on the
World Trade Center on September 11, 2001. Incidentally, there were no editorials
written specifically about Turkey during the remaining four months of 2001, but those
published from 2002-on in both newspapers had a distinct change in tone from all those
published prior to September 11.
2002:
There were two major events that took place in 2002 that were instrumental in
shaping the attitudes and opinions of the editorialists who wrote articles in 2002. The
first was the statement made by the former French president Valery Giscard d Estaing
that the EU was a “Christian Club,” and that if Turkey was allowed to join then it would
mean the “end of Europe,

35

The second was the French Presidential election that ended

up taking place between the candidates of the moderate and extreme Right, which proved
that a shift to the right in French politics had taken place.
34
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Opposition towards Turkey’s EU accession began to be published in the
. Cultuial
pages of Le Monde in 2002, and it was almost solely based on culture issues
’s EU accession for
issues were mentioned both in support of and in opposition to Turkey s _
36

the first time.

There were also concerns about what would happen after Turkey ts

admitted into the EU,such as whether Russia or the North African countries will be
allowed to join on the same precedent

There were also a few letters from Turkish

people that were published in order to give Turkey a human face and let Europ
the Turkish people as European like themselves,

One editorial even explicitly

mentioned the effect of Giscard’s statement and how it had caused the numbers
39

who opposed Turkey to soar,

These distinct changes in the tone of these editorials

published after 9/11 and during a year in which two important
France shows the impact that they had on public opinion

events took place within

and on what was written in

editorials at that time.
In Le Figaro, however, three editorials were published that argued in favor of
Turkey. Cultural issues were mentioned as reasons why some people opposed Turkey,
but they were also dismissed. Cultural issues were even referenced as reasons why
40

Turkey’s accession into the EU is important,

The absence of editorials written in

opposition towards Turkey or in support of Giscard’s statement indicates that there was
no need to fire up conservatives against Turkey’s cause, because it has already happened.
36

Zecchini, Laurent. “La Turquie europeene?” Le Monde. 14 October 2002. Also, see Barthes,
Dominique. “La Turquie n’est pas europeenne.” Le Monde. 30 October 2002.
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Pope, Nicole. “Parole de Stanbouliotes.” Le Monde. 16 December 2002.
Trean, Claire. “Europe-Turquie: mettre fin a Thypocrisie.” Le Monde. 26 November 2002.

Vaner, Semih. “Turquie: Des elections legislatives de dimanche au sommet europeen de decembre: le
baton et la carotte." Le Figaro. 1 November 2002. Also, see Brezet, Alexis. “La Turquie vaut bien un
referendum.” Le Figaro. 10 December 2002. Also, see Ternon, Yves. “Union Europeenne. La candidature
d'Ankara au programme du sommet de Copenhague: La march turque.” Le Figaro. 13 December 2002.
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In fact, the presence of editorials in such a renowned conservative newspaper that
argue in Turkey's favor by using cultural references indicates that there was an effort to
change the opinion of the conservatives who read Le Figaro,
2004/2005:
2004 was the year in which Turkey was granted status as an official candidate to
the EU. Yearly reports and been filed with the European Commission since the Helsinki
Summit in 1999, which chronicled Turkey’s successes in implementing the Copenhagen
Criteria. By 2004, it had become apparent that Turkey had nearly succeeded, and so
Turkey's application for admission into the EU came up before the Commission. It was
decided that negotiations for accession would begin in 2005. During these two years, the
editorial section of Le Figaro was full of editorials that both supported and opposed
Turkey's EU accession. It is perhaps most interesting to note that a shift in type of
41

opposition was indeed recognized in an editorial during this time,

The presence of such

a large number of editorials concerning Turkey’s plight in Le Figaro is significant
because it shows that the issue of Turkey was a hot one on the Conservative side.
In Le Monde, two editorials calling for the disappearance of any oppositions
towards Turkey that were based on cultural issues were published."^" This shows that a
shift in the type of opposition had taken place at least on the conservative side and that
the liberals were making strong efforts to sway the undecided public not to completely
side with the conservatives in the Turkey-EU debate. Also, the absence of editorials
about the issue of Turkey’s EU accession after 2004 in Le Monde is an indicator that

41

Ahtisaari, Martti and Albert Rohan. “II n'y a pas d'alternative a Tadesion; Alors que I'idee d’un
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there was no audience for editorials that argued in Turkey’s favor, and perhaps the
absence of editorials that opposed Turkey suggests that there had been success m
bringing a large majority of the French public to oppose Turkey s cause.
2006-2007:

. He
2007 was the year in which Nicolas Sarkozy was elected President of France
first became prominent as a result of his opposition towards Turkey, and eventually
became Prime Minister under Jacques Chirac, even though he did not agree with his
policy concerning Turkey. In both 2006 and 2007, editorials were published in Lb F g
that referenced a shift in type of opposition towards Turkey within France. The edit
published in 2006 even went so far as to state that politicians were now exploiting this
change in order to win votes."^'^ This can be directly applied to Nicolas Sarkozy because
. It is interesting
was the year during which he was building up his presidential campaign
that editorials citing a shift in opposition were published in Le Figaro, perhaps this was
done in order to further strengthen the conservative base that would then elect politicians
such as Sarkozy to power.

CULTURE ARGUMENTS IN LE FIGARO:
Culture was a major theme mentioned throughout Le Figaro editorials. It began
to be referenced as early as 1997, in opposition to Turkey. In February 1997, JeanClaude Casanova wrote that Europe distinguishes itself from Turkey because of religion
44

and history and that Europe celebrates the defeat of the Turks at Vienna,

This was

published just before the Turkish ambassador wrote a letter accusing the EU of taking a
4.'^

Wallstrom, Margot."Non. TUnion n’e.st pas menacee d’un "peril Turc.” Le Figaro. 2 December 2006.
Also, see Pope, Hugh. "Europeens, n'ayez pas peur de la Tiirquie!” Le Figaro. 25 August 2007.
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discriminatory stance towards Turkey.'*^ An editorial written by Jean-Claude
Casanova in 1999 argued against Turkey because it was not historically in Europe, and he
46

mentioned the geographical and religious factors as well.

In 2000, Dominique Vernier

wrote an editorial that argued against Turkey’s EU membership, using history and
religion He also exerted a negative stance towards Islam by referring to the fall of
of the most beautiful
Constantinople(now Istanbul) to the Ottomans in 1453 and how one
47

Such arguments

cities in the world had passed over into the hands of Islam at that time.
extended through 2005, although the cultural opposition was

mentioned in other ways

’sEU
during this time as well. These uses of culture as reason to oppose Turkey
accession that were published in the conservative Le Figaro show that it was becomtng
more and more acceptable to oppose Turkey on the basis of cultural differences among
French conservatives.
However, culture was also used to argue in favor of Turkey. While the
numerous editorials that opposed Turkey on the basis of cultural differences, there were
also editorials arguing that Turkey and Europe shared common histories and th
48

Turkey’s culture would enrich the EU.

It seems that editorialists who were in favor of

Turkey were targeting the readers of the more conservative Le Figaro, who because of
their status as conservatives tended to be more opposed to Turkey because of cultural
reasons rather than whether it met the Copenhagen Criteria.
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Some editorials that argued in favor of Turkey mentioned the cultural
opposition as a type of opposition that existed, and even went so

far as to discount that

type of opposition as illegitimate. In 2002, Semih Vaner mentioned the fact that relictot^
was an issue in the argument against Turkey, but does so while arguing in favor of
Turkey. In 2004, the former French Prime Minister Michel Rocard and the Former
Austrian Foreign Relations Minister wrote an editorial arguing in favor of Turkey s EU
accession, and completely dismissed all cultural issues by stating that the Commission
had shown how the cultural/geographical problems could be surpassed in its report on
50

Turkey's good progress.

a
The change in the mere mention of culture and religion as

reason to oppose Turkey to it becoming tlie sole argument behind Turkey s opposition
proves that to some degree, there was a shift in opposition to Turkey s EU accession, at
least among conservatives.
CULTURE ARGUMENTS IN LE MONDE:
The first time culture was mentioned in Le Monde was in 2002. Up until that
time, editorials were either indifferent towards Turkey’s EU accession or they were in
favor of it. In 2002, however, European identity was mentioned, as well as culture,
religion, race, and geography as reasons why Turkey should not be allowed to become a
part of the EU. On that same note, however, cultural arguments were used to argue in
favor of Turkey. One editorial, written by Abdullah Gul, the current President of Turkey
but who was the Turkish Prime Minister at the time the article was written stated that
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Turkey and Europe shared common histories.^* This use of culture to argue both for
Turkey and against it is an interesting twist in the newspaper editorial debates of
Turkey’s EU accession. This shows that the liberal French were realizing that these
culture-based oppositions were becoming more prominent and their use of cultme to
argue for Turkey’s EU accession makes this fact more concrete. However, after 2002,
the only mention of culture was in reference to its being mentioned in opposition.
Several editorials then called for all such oppositions to disappear.
In Le Monde from 1995 to 1999, no mention was made of culture, and no strong
arguments were made against Turkey. No editorials were written

in 2000 or 2001, but in

2002, editorials that argued against Turkey on the basis of culture and religion, as well as
those that questioned Turkey's place in the European identity were published.

By 2004,

however, any mention of cultural oppositions only stated that they must disappear and are
not legitimate.

This pattern of a sudden change in the presence of culture issues shows

that conservative ideology was beginning to break through, however, the liberal
editorialists of Le Monde refused to allow such ungrounded opposition towards Turkey to
exist in their editorials. The fact that the editorials after 2004 called for the cultural
opposition to disappear indicates its existence and also indicates that it was significant
enough to gamer attention from the liberal side.

CONCLUSION:
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The shift in type of opposition within France is the result of many factors,
namely the shift to the right in French politics that was the result of the fear of the
growing presence of Islam within France. However, the existence of this shift can be
most strongly proven via the presence of it in editorials written in France’s main liberal
and conservative newspapers. The editorials of the conservative Le Figaro continuously
used culture as a reason to oppose Turkey’s EU accession, and it went from being merely
mentioned to arsuments being centered on cultural opposition. Because those editorials
were continuously present within French society, they began to be embraced by the
sudden conservative trend that hit in 2002. This explains the appearance of culture
arguments in Le Monde in that same year. If all of the events of 2001 and 2002(9/11,
rise of Muslim immigrants, Giscard’s statement) as well as Turkey s gaining status as a
candidate country are taken into consideration, it shows why people began to become
more conservative and thus the reason for the growth in numbers of French people
opposed to Turkey’s EU accession based on cultural differences rather than its failure to
completely comply with the Copenhagen Criteria.
The shift in the type of opposition towards Turkey reflects the shift to the right in
French politics that also occurred during this time period. The culmination of external
events, such as 9/11, the rising numbers of the Muslim immigrant population, and the
public statement by Valery Giscard d’Estaing were all major contributing factors to the
54

political shift to the right.

In the 2002 presidential elections, the election mn-offs were

between the extreme and moderate Right candidates rather than the traditional Left and
Right Candidates, thus showing that the focus at that time was on the conservative
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sentiment.

was
Because the overwhelming sentiment within France at this time

conservative, it makes sense that Nicolas Sarkozy and other members of the UMP fully
embraced the negative stance towards Turkey and used it to further their political
aspirations. All of this is fully reflected in the editorials that were written during Chirac s
years in power and during Sarkozy’s rise to power and first few years in office.
The existence of the shift in type of opposition within France is the result of many
changes that have been taking place within France over the past fifteen to twenty years.
Politically, the French people began to embrace conservative views because of the fear of
their loss of identity as a result of the growing presence of Islam via immigration within
their nation. This fear was magnified because of the possibility of Turkey becomiUj,
member of the EU and because Turkey has almost entirely complied with the
Copenhagen Criteria. Thus, Europeans have changed their type of opposition and have
begun to base it almost solely on cultural oppositions. This shift is apparent in newspaper
editorials, in which culture was used as both a reason for opposition as well as a reason to
support Turkey. The many patterns found in these editorials prove the existence of this
shift.
Now that the existence of the shift has been established, it is necessary to look at
the reasons why the shift occurred. Many of these editorials stated that Turkey should
not be allowed to join the EU because it was “not European.” So what is it to be
“European?” The next chapter will explore this question as well as the implications
Turkey’s attempts at becoming a member of the EU on what was traditionally thought to
make up the European identity.
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European Identity Chapter

Take up the White Mans hiirclen—
And reap his old reward:
The blame of those ye better.
The hate of those ye guard—
The cr}' of hosts ye humour
(Ah, slowly!) toward the light:"Why brought he usfrom bondage.
Our loved Egyptian night?"
-Rudyard Kipling, 'The White Man's Burden’

What makes a person European? Is it a state of mind, an attitude? Is it a common
religious Judaeo-Christian heritage? Is it a geographical location on a map? Is it a shared
history, the mutual experience of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment? Or is it simply
a matter of modernity and progress? One thing that most would agree upon is that there
is no one singular way in which the European identity can be defined, thus when faced
with Turkey’s potential EU accession, the fact that there is no concrete definition of
European identity comes to the surface. It is this lack of a concrete definition of identity
that causes the debate of whether Turkey is considered European enough to become a
part of the European Union to take form.

The debate of Turkey’s EU accession has brought forth many uncertainties. What
is it to be European ? What makes Bulgaria or Greece, Turkey’s geographical neighbors,
European, while Turkey is not? Are there common attributes that are possessed by all
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from other parts of the
●Europeans.' and that separate them from peoples and nations
world? Identities are eontinuously shifting and ehanging, and the only way for them to
remain somewhat constant is to be relational. Therefore one’s identity is based on die
differences that separate it from another . Throughout history, Europeans traditionally
derived their identity from what they were not, which was

consistently the Muslims of

the East. However, during the Twentieth century . with the advent of globalization and
continuously shifting ideas of what it was to be European throughout the rise and fall of
Imperialism, the changing borders and nationalities that resulted from two World Wars.
and the ideological battle between Communism and Capitalism, the piece of the
its differentiation from Islam. As long as
European identity that remained constant was its
Europeans could base their identities on things such as common religious backgro
and common memories of history, both of which were factors that separated them from
Islam and the nations and peoples who practiced it, the European identity could remain
some degree concrete. However, Turkeys’ request to

to

become officially a part of the EU,

and the growing likelihood of this occurrence, has challenged Europeans

’ identities and

has caused a crisis of identity to develop within Europe.

WHAT IS IDENTITY?

In order to understand the complexities that have gone into the formation of the
European identity, it is first important to understand the concept of the use of the Other
in identity formation. The concept of the use of the “Other” is mentioned throughout
literature concerning the European identity, because the “Other” has played such a large
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role in the creation of it. The use of the other is mentioned in Gerard Delanty’s
Inventinii Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality, as a pivotal part of identity formation. Delanty
wrote that identity could be based on the state, gender, church, and color, giving racism
56

as an example.

Several important thinkers have cited tlie use of the ‘other’ in identity

formation, which is the unifying aspect of all of their tlioughts on identity.
Another theory of identity that relates to the concept of the “Other,” is that of
Etienne Balibar in We, the People ofEurope?, Balibar believes in the presence of the
ethos” and “demos” in identity formation. The “ethos” is an “imagined community of
members,” while the “demos" is the “people,' as the body that makes decisions and has
certain rights. According to Balibar, the construction of the idea of the border and
national belonging is a result of this dynamic between the “ethos” and “demos. It leads
to exclusion, thus dividing the majorities and minorities, natives and foreigners, and
,57

leading to the derivation of identity from a distinct “other.'
Iver B. Neumann also wrote a book on the use of the ‘other in European identity
formation in which he referenced many scholars and philosophers who assert this claim
in their works. According to Neumann,G.W.F. Hegel is one of the main theorists who
specifically referenced the use of the “other” in forming one’s own identity in his work
Phenomenology ofSpirit by stating that

Each is for the other the middle term through which each meditates
itself; and each is for himself, and for the other, an immediate
being on its own accord, which at the same time is such only
56
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through this mediation. They recognize tliemselves as mutually
58

recognizing one another.

Hegel has had considerable influence on

the thoughts of people concerning the
into many different ways

in

formation of identity, which have evolved through the years
the use of the “Eastern
which identity can be defined. Neumann specifically addresses
the works of Georg
Other” in the formation of the European identity by referencing
Simmel, Carl Schmitt, and Friedrich Nietzsche.
Simmel also refers to the use of the ‘other’ by referring to the concept of the
, writes Simmel, causes the
‘stranger’ in identity formation. The presence of the stranger
59

question of the self to rise to the surface.

Neumann then cites Schmitt, who wrote

about the influence and importance in the concept of the public enemy in i

y

formation.^® Also according to Neumann, Nietzsche believed that the self creates its own
>6i

image of the world through its perceptions of “others.

It is easy to see the influence of

Hegel’s belief in the use of a distinct ‘Other’ in identity formation found in these
works that were presented by Neumann regarding the existence and importance of the
Eastern ‘Other.’
The philosophies of identity of these important

thinkers all center on the necessity

of the existence of a distinct ‘other’ so that a group can define its identity from what it is
not. This is an important component of understanding the opposition towards Turkey that
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is based on its affect on the European identity. It is now necessary to apply this
theory throughout the history of the relations between Europe and Turkey in order to see
how Europe's vision of Turkey as its ‘other’ began and evolved throughout history to
become what it is today.

EUROPEAN HISTORY AND THE EASTERN ‘OTHER’:

For centuries, the formation of the European identity has been affirmed by the
distinct awareness of the presence of the Eastern ‘Other.’ Much of the territory that is
today known as Europe was once a part of the great Roman Empire. The Roman Empire
was the supreme world power for centuries, before growing too large and having to be
split into the Western Roman Empire, and the eastern Byzantine Empire in 284 AD. The
Roman Empire went on to fall in 476 AD,and the territory that was once united under
one name began to split off into separate nations. The Byzantine Empire, however,
managed to survive for nearly 700 more years, and after being invaded by the Ottomans
in 1453, became known as the Ottoman Empire.^” It was through the Cmsades that were
begun in 1091 that the peoples of Europe began to unite together under the name of
Christianity against the peoples of the East who had taken over the teiTitories that they
felt were tied to the origins of their religion. It was this common theme of religion that
was one of the first unifying factors of the peoples who inhabited the territory that would
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eventually come to be known as Europe. It was also through the opposition to Islam
63

that these Christians began come together in unity.
Roger Ballard also asserted this use of Christianity as the common bond uniting
the Crusaders against tlieir Eastern foes, although he notes that the religious factor was
the only unifying one. as there was no mention of ‘Europe,’ or of ‘Europeans, at this
point in time. He also wrote that the Crusaders made no attempts at understanding their
Islamic opponents, they simply formed opinions and took actions that were based upon
their own conceptions and prejudices, thus enabling them to justify their actions.
According to Ballard, the Christians of this time believed that anything that veered from
their own form of Christianity was heretical and evil, and must be destroyed, hence, the
commencement of the deeply entrenched opposition of the Christian West towards the
Muslim East. The Crusaders used these beliefs of their own ‘righteousness’ and
‘pureness’ to create distorted images of their Muslim foes, which became engrained in
the minds of Europeans for centuries, and formed a portion of the base of the opposition
64

towards Turkey that is found amongst conservative Europeans today.
The animosity towards the Muslim world as a result of the Cmsades extended on
throughout history to the campaigns against the Muslims in Spain from 718 to 1492
AD.^^ Much of the culture of southern Spain has its roots from when the Muslims
occupied it during those years. However, the fact that there was a Muslim presence
within Europe for nearly 700 years is something that is nearly forgotten amongst
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Europeans.

The East, which came to be associated with the almighty Ottoman

Empire, continued to be a place with which fear was associated because of the constantly
67

looming threat of invasion,

One such invasion that has not been forgotten by Austrians

to this day occurred in the year 1529, when the Ottoman Turks laid siege at the gates of
Vienna. It was not until the year 1683 that the Habsburgs, with the help of Pope Innocent
XI, drove out the Ottomans. Once this occurred, the threat of a European invasion by the
Ottoman Empire began to diminish as the birth of capitalism and creation of new
technologies allowed the different European Empires to begin to explore new lands and
68

opportunities during the age of Imperialism and Colonialism.
The age of Imperialism and Colonialism was another time in which the West and
East came into contact with one another. The Europeans of the West saw themselves as
vastly superior in intellect and in technology to the East. They thus used this
superiority/inferiority complex to both create and invade the “Orient . According to
Edward Said in Orientalism, the use of the word “oriental” was‘canononical, having
been employed by Chaucer, Mandeville, Shakespeare, Dryden,Pope, and Byron. It
»69

designated Asia or the East, geographically, morally, culturally.
Gerard Delanty further extended this use of the East as the Other by writing that
the Orient has been used as a sort of “mirror” through which the Europeans could see
themselves in a chapter of his book Inventing Europe, titled “Europe in the Mirror of the
Orient.” He wrote that Europe saw other civilizations and tried to impart their qualities
which they saw to be most important to those civilizations, and the East is no exception.
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Thus, the Orient, through the age of imperialism and colonialism, became a
“distorted miiTof through which the West, i.e. Europe,saw itself. However the fact that
70

the Orient was the “East” and also the “Other” was never forgotten.
It was also during this time that the East began to take on a more romantic view
because it began to become less of a threat to the West. Thus, once the empires of
Europe began their campaigns of colonization around the globe, more and more
Europeans began to enter into the Orient. It became fashionable to have knowledge
about the Orient, and it became a place where Europeans could take part in things that
they could never have imagined in Europe, thus the concept of the Orient becoming a
place of pleasure, while the West was characterized by social stability and
responsibility.^' Thus, wrote Delanty, the “invention” of the Orient enabled Europe to
develop its own identity, simply put “the West was what the Orient was not.

Thus, in

this way, the Western identity was foimed out of negation.^" Delanty also wrote that by
the eighteenth century the Orient was seen as Innocent and childlike,” while the West
was seen as a representation of “progress and modernity. However, the goal was not for
the Orient to “catch-up” with the West, but rather to imitate it to a lesser degree, which
kept it separate from the West but also further enabled the distorted mirror image to
exist.^'' Their more negative, subservient views towards the colonial peoples led to a
phenomenon that would become so engrained in the peoples of Europe that it has almost
become second nature, racism.
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Racism began to take hold in Europe during the eighteenth century. The
Orient also began to be regarded as “weak,” in part because of the weakening Ottoman
Empire. This was also when the myths of both the ‘noble savage’ and the ‘decadent
orient’ began to appear in Europe, further romanticizing the Orient. However, it is
important to note that the savage was only thought of as “noble” because of its complete
74

submission” to the West.

It was also during this time that the concept of “civilization

began to form in the West. There is a significant difference between civilization and
‘culture,’ for ‘civilization’ was European, while ‘culture’ referred to anything other than
75

European.
The myth of the ‘White Man’s Burden,’ made popular through the poem written
by Rudyard Kipling, characterized the way in which Europeans conducted themselves
towards the Orient as well as towards the other continents upon which they were
colonizing and building empires during the nineteenth century. It began to become
widely believed amongst Europeans that it was their responsibility to restore culture and
knowledge to the Orient, which were things that it had ‘lost’ over the course of European
76

imperialism and colonialism,

It was also during this time that Europeans began to

strengthen their association of the Christian faith with their identity as Europeans.
Because the Orient was not Christian, this fortified the lines of separation and the view of
it as the ‘Other.’ Thus, Europeans set out in attempts of ‘converting’ the peoples of the
77

Orient to Christianity through imperialism.
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Throughout the events of history (the Crusades, Imperialism/Colonialism),
Europeans continuously looked towai'ds the peoples of the Orient as different, as the
departing point from which they could define tlieir own identity. As long as they could
assert that their identity was completely separate from that of the Orientals that they came
in contact with throughout history, their identity could remain concrete. Delanty
,78

concluded that racism “lay at the core of the European identity,

This is definitely the

case as far as colonialism and imperialism is concerned. Through violence and conquest,
Europeans reached the twentieth century with assurance that the peoples of the Orient
that they had encountered were not only beneath them, but also completely separated
from them. Thus, the modem idea of the European identity was formed based on the
distinct line of demarcation that Europeans saw between East and West, which gave them
a sense of racial “superiority” and separated them from their “inferior Oriental
counterparts.

OTHER DEFINITIONS OF EUROPEAN IDENTITY:

Although the use of the “Other” to determine one’s identity has played a
significant role in the formation of European Identity, other factors have played roles as
well. Much has been written concerning the creation of the European identity, as many
scholars, philosophers, and politicians have desired to create a definition of what makes
one European. A few influential thinkers who have written and studied about the concept
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of what it is to be European have had a large impact on how many people view the
European identity. Thus it is important to be familiar with their beliefs on the subject.
DERRIDA:
Jacques Derrida's publication The Other Heading is cited throughout literature
concerning the European identity. In The Other Heading, Derrida referenced Edmund
79

Husserl’s idea that Europe's culture was a direct descendent of that of ancient Greece.
However, he takes the concept a bit further by writing that although the European culture
and society has taken much from the Greek culture, its identity is also derived from many
80

different sources, such as Jewish, Arabic, Christian, Roman, Germanic, etc.

Derrida

also claimed that by European culture and identity being inspired by ancient Greece, it
also took on the ancient Greek characteristic of distinguishing itself from the Egyptian
“other.

>81

Derrida was also one of the first to believe in the concept of a multicultural

Europe, for he wrote “I am not, nor do I feel, European in every part, that is, European
through and through... My cultural identity - that in the name of which I speak - is not
only European, it is not identical to itself... I feel European among other things.. It is up
to others, and up to me among them, to decide.”^" It is this belief in a multicultural
Europe that differentiates Derrida from other thinkers and writers who have written on
the subject, and has thus been influential in the overall construction of the European
identity.
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VALERY:
Paul Valery was a French writer, poet, and philosopher who spent much time
pondering the aspects that made up the European identity, and his works are often cited in
studies and publications that are written about the concept of the European identity.
According to Heikki Mikkeli, in Europe as on Idea and on Identity, the essential values
of the European identity, as defined by Paul Valery in his publication entitled Varietel,
are the presence of Roman law and order, the Christian faith, and the critical spirit of
83

Greece.

Other works cite Valery’s beliefs in a certain European ‘spirit,’ as well as in a
84

common culture, both of which have had a unifying effect on the European continent.
His Eurocentric views were opposed by Jacques Derrida, who wrote in The Other
Heading that Europeans could not be men of universality, for it was not their universal
right.

Valery’s influence on the concept of the European identity can be seen

throughout works written on the subject.
HEIDEGGER:
Another philosopher and thinker whose works have had an impact on the thought
process concerning the European identity was Martin Heidegger. Heidegger was a
student of Edmund Husserl until he lost his rights when the Nazis came to power during
86

the 1930’s. He was also inspired by German philosopher Max Scheler.

However, his

beliefs that the European identity can be derived from the ancient times have had an
influence on the overall concept of what it is to be European. Heidegger, like Husserl,
believed that the cultural origins of Europe were to be found in Antiquity, however, he
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believed that the European culture was more inspired by Rome, who was Greekinspired. An entire work entitled “Heidegger’s Parmenides: Greek Modernity and the
Classical Legacy,” was written about how Heidegger believe the origins of Europe to be
not Greek, but Roman, hence the imperialistic nature and tendencies of the European
S7

continent.'

Although the belief that Europe’s culture and identity was derived from

Antiquity is one that has been circulating since the Enlightenment, Heidegger’s study of
the subject has had considerable influence on how many people perceive the origins of
Europe, and thus the European identity.
GENERAL CHARACTERSITICS:
When one combines the factors of European identity, as stated by Derrida,
Valery, and Heidegger, a sort of general picture of what it is to be European, in the minds
of Europeans, begins to take form. The influence of these characteristics of what it is to
be European can be found in the works of Gerhard Delanty. He even took it a step
further by going into specifics by citing the state, economy, culture, and society of
Europe as forces that have greatly impacted the European identity through
scientific/technological advances, presence of the bourgeoisie, and present day attempts
at forming an official culture. He also defined it according to the common experiences of
88

Christianity, civilization, the West, imperialism, racisim, fascism, and modernity.
Some general ways in which European identity can be defined is through Christianity,
common history and experience, democracy, a uniting ‘spirit,’ and a belief in modernity
Many scholars and philosophers have attempted to define Europe by certain
characteristics that they believe to be an essential component of the European identity.
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Christianity, many believe, has played a large role in the formation of the European
consciousness Both Gerard Delanty and T.S. Eliot believed that Christianity had the
largest impact on the European culture as it is known today, however Eliot pointed out
that it was not the religion itself, but its influence on the development of European art and
laws.

The tragedies of two world wars and the Holocaust, which both occurred on

European soil during the past 100 years, furtlier attest to Eliot’s belief in Christianity
playing a role in the construction of the European identity in a strictly cultural and
historical sense.
Another area that many believe to be a base component of the European identity
is the fact that those who like to define themselves as Europeans believe that they share a
common history and experience. Many believe that the common experience of the
Renaissance and the Enlightenment have created a sense of identity amongst Europeans
that only those who have been brought up in a place where post-Enlightenment ideas
have shaped society can possess.*^® However, European history can attest to the fact that
throughout the centuries, Europe has suffered from multiple divisions between nationstates and between East and West Europe,

Geography has also been cited as playing a

role in the formation of the European identity, however, since no official map of Europe
exists, geography seems to be a weaker aspect of the European identity. Delanty also
associates geography with the confrontation with Islam.^“ It is obvious that history and
geography have had some influence on the formation of the European identity; however.
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there are enough contradictions to prevent either from becoming a prominent source
of definition of European identity.
Many believe that the common existence of liberal democracy and Roman law
within the European laws created throughout the centuries within Europe plays a role in
what creates the European identity. It has been cited as a unifying factor as well as a part
of the identity.'^'There is also the concept of a ‘spirit,’ or ‘attitude,’ of Europe as a part
of what makes a person European. Europe’s spiritual identity has its roots in Greek
94

philosophy, which has had a great influence on European laws and thoughts,

Valery

advocated this belief in a common uniting European spirit.^^ Another aspect that some
believe to be part of the European identity is the presence of modernity within Eiuope.
Starting with the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, Europeans began to take pride in
their belief that they were the most advanced peoples on earth. It was because of these
advances in science, medicine, and farming that they began to be able to go out into the
,96

world and conquer those who they believed to be “savages,

This belief in their own

modernity has lasted for centuries, and plays a large role in the idea of the European
identity.
From all of the intellectual thoughts and publications concerning the European
identity, it can be concluded that there is no one way that it can be defined. Many factors
have gone into what Europeans believe to be a part of their identity as Europeans, from
historical events and memories, to religion, to the belief in democracy. However, one can
also negatively attribute racism, and chauvinism through imperialism and colonialism of
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the worlds that they believed to be inferior to them. Because none of these factors of
the European identity have remained constant throughout history, Europeans relied
heavily on their differences from the East(Turkey)in order to maintain some degree of a
concrete identity. However, Turkey’s attempts at becoming a part of Europe have thrown
even this traditionally stable part of what Europeans based their identities upon off
balance, causing a crisis of identity. It is the fear of the traditional ideas of what makes
up the European identity being changed once again and the fear of Europe becoming
multicultural that has caused many Europeans to turn inward and take more conservative
stances towards Turkey. The EU has taken this identity crisis and tried to make it into an
issue of identity politics by attempting to define the European identity in order to create a
more solid base from which their own political agenda can move forward.

IDENTITY POLITICS AND THE EUROPEAN IDENTITY:

As far as the European Union is concerned, the question of the European identity
has become an issue of identity politics. The EU has been trying to create an official
European identity so as to become more than just an economic union. The European
Coal and Steel Community(ECSC)was founded after WWII in order to promote peace
and stability on the war-ravaged European continent. It was made up of Western
European nations who, for centuries, had been cultivating their own distinct cultures, as
well as rivalries and oppositions against each other. The ECSC was initially an economic
union, formed on the belief that the creation of economic ties could foster peace on the
continent. As the years passed, the ECSC became the European Economic Community
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(EEC), and then it became the European Community(EC), and with that change also
became more politically minded. It began to become apparent that in order for it to truly
become a powerful force in the world, it would need the undying support of its citizens.
Thus, in 1973, the EC formed a committee whose sole purpose was to define a common
European identity.
In 1973, the EC released a “Declaration on European Identity” enabling them to
“achieve a better definition of their relations with other countries and of their
,97

responsibilities and the place which they occupy in world affairs,

According to this

declaration, the European identity was based on the common European heritage, which
included consistent attitudes towards life, principles of a representative democracy, the
rule of law, social justice, and human rights standards. In 1977, the Commission of the
EC developed a ‘cultural policy’ whose goal was to “boost” people’s awareness of the
98

existence of a common European cultural identity,

Then, in 1984, the Commission

formed the “Committee for a People’s Europe,” whose purpose

was to promote the EC’s

identity and its image in order to create unity among its citizens and to strengthen its
99

Stance before the rest of the world.

Several other actions were taken by the EC

throughout the rest of the 1980’s, including the Single European Act in 1987, which
aimed at creating more unity within the EC by eliminating nearly all remaining barriers
within the EC,and the Schengen Agreement in 1985, which allowed EC citizens to cross
100

any EC border freely.
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Once the EC became the EU, it began to become apparent that the EU was
i4

experiencing a democratic deficit” because its institutions were not transparent, and
because most EU citizens did not have a good understanding of how the EU worked. So,
in 2001 at the European Council Meeting at Laeken, it was decided that in order to
lOI

decrease the “deficit,” an EU constitution was in order,

The constitution was meant to

strengthen democracy, which many hoped would encourage EU citizens to identify more
with the EU than with their nation, duis fostering a sense of European identity throughout
102

the EU.

The debates surrounding the EU constitution were very heated, resulting in

each nation having its own referendum. The possibility of including reference to

a
103

common religion sparked heated debates throughout the EU,involving the Pope,

This

move would be controversial because it would discriminate against Muslim Turkey, thus
it was decided after much debate that religion would be left out of the preamble to the EU
104

constitution.

As a result of this debate as well as debates on other aspects of the

proposed constitution, the EU has been left with no official constitution, and no real sense
of an official overall European identity that transcends the national identity. This has
become increasingly problematic in the debates surrounding Turkey s pending EU
accession.

THE EUROPEAN IDENTITY AND TURKEY:
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The issue of Turkey’s potential accession into the EU has brought to the
surface the fact that there is no distinct definition of European identity. According to
Luisa Passerini, people tend to cling to and foster identities when they feel uprooted or
endangered. She believes that the emergence of the debate surrounding the European
identity is a sign of both “discomfort” and “imcertainty ” but at the same time it is a
105

“regressive operation to protect old values,

As a result, Europeans have felt the need

to define their identity in order to protect themselves from this newfound challenge.
Talal Asad further extends this thought by writing that the “discoui'se of identity indicates
not the rediscovery of ethnic loyalties so much as the undermining of old certainties...
106

The discourse of European identity is a symptom of anxieties about non-Europeans.
Thus, the growing consciousness of the European identity, or lack thereof, has only
emerged as a major issue facing Europe because of Turkey’s potential accession.
Since the 19“^ century, Turkey has been making reforms in the image of Europe.
These reforms began in response to the declining power of the Ottomans, but continued
through the 1923 Revolution because of pressures from Europe itself. Or, as Neumann
107

wrote, in order to “play at the Concert of Europe, ‘the Turk’ had to learn new tunes.
However, no matter how many reforms were made within Turkey, it was still not
regarded as equivalent to the other European nations during the early part of the twentieth
century. Even as Turkey became its own nation during this time, past prejudices from
108

Europeans remained in place.
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of the debates concerning Turkey’s EU accession evolved from history into the
heated issue that it is today.
The question of European identity and how Turkey fits within it is a very
109

controversial one. Conservative Europeans are not persuaded that Turkey is European.
Moreover, those who are sympathetic to Turkey’s cause are still skeptical because they
believe that it is not Western enough. Many conservative Europeans see Turkey’s
situation as an identity crisis of its own, a crisis of a country that is stuck somewhere
no
between Europe and Asia, making it a sort of “hybrid,” according to Kevin Robbins.
1

However, the existence of the debate surrounding Turkey’s EU accession has caused
enough of a commotion to catch the attention of all EU citizens, causing them to question
their own identities. It is from this exploration of identity amongst both Europeans and
Turks that the solution to the issue at hand can be found.

CONCLUSION:

The debate surrounding Turkey’s EU accession has brought to the forefront the
fact that there is no distinct definition of European identity. However, the opposition to
Turkey that is based on whether it is European remains prominent amongst Europeans.
Gerard Delanty has written that the European identity is “rapidly becoming a white
,UII

bourgeois populism defined in opposition to the Muslim World and the Third World.
This seems to be the case among many Europeans, especially conservatives. Many
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factors and events have gone into the traditional definitions of what it is to be
European. However,

as history has shown time and again, the religious, historical, and

democratic ideals that so many Europeans feel is a base of their identity have failed to
brino complete unity to the European continent. The fact that Europeans are unable to
create a distinct definition of what it is to be European has consequences that come to the
surface because of the growing multicultural society within Europe as a result of
in

immigration Muslim immigrants have changed parts of European culture and society i
ways that Europeans never dreamed possible, and this has laid the foundation for the

identity crisis that Europeans have begim to deal with as a result of Turkey s potential EU
accession.

53

MUSLIM IMNUGRANTS CHAPTER

The phrase “a few bad apples can destroy the whole bunch,” is particularly
applicable to the cuiTent situation of Muslim immigrants in Europe. Their growing
presence has brought to the forefront the negative results of discrimination and the
inability of the European nations to successfully integrate them into their societies. Not
all Muslim immigrants in Europe fall under the stigma of being uneducated, fanatically
religious, and anti-Western. In fact the opposite is tme; a large number of Muslim
immigrants are not only very successful in school but are also successfully integrated into
their communities. In his article Bridging the European Union and Turkey: The Turkish
Diaspora in Europe,” Talip Kucukcan wrote that the second and third generations of the
Turkish immigrants were well integrated into the societies of their host countries and had
even been able to develop and establish civil society associations. These organizations
112

have been instrumental in creating a Turkish social capital in countries like Holland.
However, it is the Muslim immigrants who, as a result of their abject poverty and
inability to integrate into the local culture, take part in terrorist organizations and become
extreme in their Islamic faith. This type of immigrant seems to be the one on whom the
European stereotype toward Muslims as a whole is created. It seems that this stereotype
is behind much of the European opposition to the accession of Turkey, a country with a
''■ Kucukcan, Talip. 2007. “Bridging the European Union and Turkey: The Turkish Diaspora in Europe.
Insight Turkey. Vol. 9. No. 4. 85-99.
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secular democratic government but a predominantly Muslim society, into the
European Union.

BACKGROUND/CONTEXT:

There are several potential reasons for this shift: changes in political leaders,
changes in public opinion, world events involving the Middle East and the West, and
us
identity politics,

The public opinion of Europeans has been very important throughout

the process of Turkey’s attempts at EU accession, and has been influenced by several
factors, namely the growing presence of Islam within Europe as a

result of the influx of

immigration during the second half of the twentieth century from Muslim nations,
including Turkey. A combination of negative repercussions of this influx of immigrants
has caused Europeans, especially conservatives, to unfairly associate them with Turkey
EU accession. The violence and poverty of many immigrant communities that has come
to be negatively associated with Turkey, as has the fear of the economic repercussions of
Turkey’s accession on the European economies, as well as the rising fear of terrorism
from fundamentalist Muslim groups. The shift in opposition to Turkey s EU accession
seems to have been influenced by the negative European perceptions towards Muslim
immigrants.
Since Europe has been experiencing a rise in Muslim immigration since the time
in which Turkey first applied for membership in the European Economic Community,
their perceptions towards Muslims as a whole, and therefore towards Turkey, are shaped
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by their day-to-day encounters with the Muslim immigrants present in their
countries. In 2003, there were more than 23 million Muslim immigrants residing in
Europe, which was nearly 5 percent of the population. This figure has grown in twenty
years time, for in 1982 there were 15.6 million Muslims in Europe, making up 3.2
percent of the population. When Turkey is included in the EU,the figures for Muslims in
114

Europe will grow to 90 million, making up fifteen percent of the European population.
According to a report of the Independent Commission on Turkey in 2004, opposition to
Turkey’s EU accession seems to be the strongest in the countries where there is a
significant Turkish immigrant minority, such as Germany, France, Austria, the
115

Netherlands, and Belgium.

It is this growth of Muslim presence within Europe that has

made so many Europeans fearful and therefore opposed to Turkey s EU accession.

HISTORY OF MUSLIM IMMIGRATION IN EUROPE:

A Muslim presence in Europe started to reach high levels during the twentieth
century, with the anival of Muslim immigrants from Europe’s colonies. Three main
waves can be attributed to the growing influx of Muslim immigrants into Europe, the first
coming just after World War II, when there was a widespread shortage of workers within
Europe. Muslim men were invited as “guest workers” to come live and work in Europe
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under the conditions that they would eventually return to their home countries.
Also, the decolonization of the French and British Empires during the postwar years
contributed to the rise of immigration, as subjects of those colonies were offered
citizenship in both Britain and France. The second wave occurred during the 1970’s and
1980's, with the repatriation of the families of these “guest workers” in Europe. The
third wave involved asylum seekers from civil wars and persecution in their home
countries. The ending result of these three waves was a very large, dynamic group of
Muslims within Europe who wished to keep their culture, religion, and traditions, while
116

their European counterparts encouraged tlieir assimilation into European culture.
Initially, these immigrants consisted of mostly men, who went virtually unnoticed
in European society. But when their families began to join them in Europe, their
presence began to become more apparent as their numbers grew. They also began to
become more visible in their communities because of their religious and cultural practices
and appearances. These immigrants often ended up living in communities that were
separate from the other Europeans, often in the bonlieiis(suburbs) of France or in
specific, secluded neighborhoods of other major European cities. Because they were not
in the centers of the cities, and they were often unskilled workers, these immigrants were
put at a major disadvantage when compared to their European counterparts in the job
market and were therefore forced to take low-paying jobs."^ The cycle of low paying
jobs, little or no education, and the inability to get out of their communities is commonly
associated with Muslim immigrants in Europe, even those who are of the second and
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third generations of immigrant families,

However, this observation is

stereotypical and cannot be applied to all Muslim immigi’ants and their descendents. But
at the same time, it is precisely those who fall into this cycle that are the ones who are
attracting the animosity that exudes from Europeans. This cycle has caused poverty and
has led to the rise of Islamic fundamentalism as some of these Muslims have begun to
embrace radical Islam in rebellion against a hostile environment. According to a report
by the European Commission against Racism and hitolerance(ECRI),“immigrants, and
particularly foreigners, are presented as the persons responsible for the deterioration of
security conditions, terrorism, unemployment and increased public expenditure. This
process of stigmatization and criminalization provides a breeding ground for racial
discrimination towards this part of Europe’s population. Poverty, the rise of political
Islamism, as well as the fear of the economic effect of an influx of poor, unskilled
immigrants have all been factors in the negative opinions of Europeans towards Muslim
119

immigrants.

The Turkish immigrant community in Germany has been no exception

to this treatment of Muslim immigrants in Europe.

TURKISH IMMIGRANTS IN GERMANY:

The negative actions of certain Muslim immigrants have had a large impact on the
opinion of Europeans towards Turkey’s EU accession. However, more often that not,
these negative actions of Muslim immigrants are a direct response of the ways in which
they are regarded and treated by their European counterparts. The Turkish immigrants in
1 18
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Germany are a good example of this. Germany contains one of the largest Turkish
expatriate communities in Europe. However, Germany is also a prominent opponent of
Turkey’s EU accession, since the election of Angela Merkel in 2005.
German citizenship is based on blood, orjus sanguinis. Thus, any person can
easily become Gernian, even if they were bom in a different country, as long as they have
German ancestry. This makes it rather difficult for Turkish immigrants in Germany to
gain citizenship, although it is possible once they have reached certain challenging
120

measures.

Also, as in most European coimtries, native Germans and Turks live
121

separately with much animosity existing between the two.

Former German Chancellor

Helmut Kohl also stated at one point that Turkish immigrants are

German citizens of

Turkish heritage,” in response to Neo-nazi attacks on Turkish immigrant residences in the
122

early 1990’s.

Another separating factor is that Islam is not given the same legal

distinction as Catholicism, Protestantism, and Judaism within the German government.
Christian and Jewish schools and churches are subsidized by the state, while mosques are
123

not.

Because of the anxiety and animosity that these Turkish immigrants receive

before they even set foot in Germany, many begin to turn towards measures that they
would normally veer away from in Turkey.
Turkish immigrants in Germany are met with the same prejudices and hostilities
that Muslim immigrants are met with across Europe. The German media has focused
largely on this fact, and uses it as a separation mechanism, citing Huntington’s thesis on
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the ‘Clash of Civilizations’ as a reason to not help these immigrants to integrate into
society. Germans throughout history have created a part of their identity based on the
opposition towards an “Other.” Traditionally, it was the Jews who were separated from
Germans as the “Other” from which they could derive their identity, with disastrous
results. However, since World War II and the influx of immigrants into Germany,the
category of “Other” has been shifted from Jews to Muslims. It is partially because of the
inherent prejudice of the German people towards outsiders that the Turkish immigrants in
Germany have remained a separate entity(Haddad and Smith, p. 183-185). As a result,
many have resorted to religion in order to find an identity and a sense of belonging.
Mosques have taken on the form of community centers, markets, etc. in Germany rather
than simply houses of prayer like they are in Turkey, thus forcing these immigrants to
become even more inward, and increasing the German animosity towards them (Haddad
and Smith, p. 186-187). As a result, the Turkish immigrant community in Germany has
“redefined” the idea of being Turkish from it being a nationality to a religious distinction.
Thus it is the “Muslim Turks” who give Germans their perception of Turkey in a
religious sense rather than in a political one, causing them to oppose Turkey s EU
accession.

EUROPEANS’ INTERNAL ISSUES:

Although the ways in which many European Muslims live and behave in Europe
has caused them to be discriminated against, much of this opposition to their presence
comes from within Europeans themselves. Europeans had been largely “emigrant”
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during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, with citizens migrating to North
America and other areas of the world, leaving their mother countries mostly homogenous.
However, after WWII, with the first big wave of immigration, Europe had to begin to
deal with migration into Europe. Thus, Europeans were never really open and receptive
to the

idea of immigration into their homelands and therefore never took the initiative to
124

aide these immigrants in integrating into European culture.

The large influx of

immigrants is further negated by the fact that more and more Europeans are becoming
xenophobic, or fearful of foreigners. Many xenophobes are fearful of the potential
outcomes of change within their cultures as a result of the influx of immigrants, and
125

therefore perceive them in negative ways.

Racism has traditionally been present in

Europe, stemming back to the anti-Semitism that existed for centuries. The growing
number of Muslims within Europe has given racist Europeans a new group to target.
Also, the rise of terrorism from Jihadi Salifis has given Europeans a reason to become
fearful and cause many to stereotype Muslims as a whole as pro-violence or as terrorists.
The influx of Muslim immigrants into Europe has also caused many Europeans to
question their identity as Europeans, questioning where Islam fits within that identity.
This has been particularly the case in France, where there have been problems with
integrating immigrants into the French society. There are also two schools of thought
concerning integration. Many Europeans believe that integration only truly occurs in the
second or third generation and is also indicated by mastery of the colloquial language,
improvement in performance at school, rising in position on the social ladder, marriages
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between immigrants and locals, a decline in birth rate, and a decrease in religious
126

practice,

However, according to Hasan Kosebalaban, integration is a “structural and

institutional term without cultural connotations” and is a “recognition and appreciation of
multiculturalism. Integration is different from assimilation in that it shifts identities
towards each other, making the necessary changes along the way, but does not try to
dissipate the existing identities that do not fit. In theory, integration/multiculturalism
makes the most sense, but many Europeans are not fond of the idea of having to make
changes in their culture in order to live in harmony with immigrants who do not, in their
minds, belong there in the first place. This feeling is exemplified in a statement by
German Chancellor Angela Merkel that “the idea of a multicultural society cannot
«127

succeed. It is prone to failure from the start. Multiculturalism is not integration,

It is

these issues with integration that have caused major changes within Europe that have
affected sentiments towards Turkey.
All of these factors have contributed to a shift of established European political
parties to the right in terms of immigration. According to an article by Dan Bilefsky and
Ian Fisher published in the New York Times in 2006, anti-immigration stances were
traditionally taken by more conservative European parties. These issues also seem to
have pushed some moderates, both ordinary people and politicians, to question the limits
128

of tolerance and multiculturalism.

As a reflection of these opinions towards

immigration becoming more negative amongst Europeans, leaders such as French
President Nicolas Sarkozy have been elected with campaign platforms that are
126
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specifically anti-immigration as well as anti-Turkish EU accession. Within his first
few months in office in 2007, Sarkozy put together a bill that would make it more
difficult for immigrant families to come into France because they would have to learn
basic French as well as its history and customs before being allowed into the country.
They would also be required to sign a contract stating that they would make every effort
to integrate their families into France. All of this is in effort to protect the French
129

identity, another important aspect of Sarkozy’s immigration policy,

Europeans have

many reservations and prejudices as far as Muslim immigrants are concerned, and this is
shaping their attitudes towards Turkey and its EU aspirations as a result.

HOW TURKEY IS AFFECTED:

Under the Schengen Agreement, the free movement of EU citizens throughout
130

any EU country is guaranteed.

If Turkey were to become a member of the EU,this

freedom would apply to Turkish citizens as well. Since there are already such large
numbers of immigrants from Muslim countries from North Africa and the Middle East,
the free movement of Turkish citizens strikes a major chord among Europeans. They
envision the influx of Turks into Europe in the same way that they envision a large influx
of Muslim immigrants, and not in the ways that they envision the movement of people
from other EU states.131 Many Europeans worry about the economic effects of the large
immigration of unskilled migrants from poor areas of Turkey if it is admitted into the
129
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EU. ■ They also worry that they will take over jobs that Europeans feel rightfully
belong to them and that unwanted crime and violence will accompany thern.^^^ They are
also concerned with the idea of their governments having to pay for these unskilled and
134

uneducated immigrants and their families who tend to live in abject poverty,

This is

one of the main reasons for European opposition to Turkey’s EU accession and has been
heavily influenced by the large numbers of immigrants already present within Europe.

The opinion of the public vis-a-vis Turkey’s EU accession is very important in the
success of its accession into the EU. As mentioned earlier, the number of xenophobes in
Europe is on the rise, and it is this fear of foreigners that is related to their opinion
135

towards Turkey, seen through the “prism” of Muslim immigrants in Europe,

A study

done by Sara De Master and Michael K. Le Roy in their academic work “Xenophobia
and the European Union,” empirically investigates the relationship between the support
for European integration and xenophobia. In the study, they used data from the
Eurobarometer 41.1 from 1994, which included questions about support for European
integration as well as regarding the perceptions of foreigners. The respondents were
asked seven questions concerning foreigners in order to properly gauge their opinions
towards foreigners and in order make sure that their xenophobic tendencies were
accurately displayed. The questions touched on the respondents’ thoughts towards the
amount of immigrants in their countries, whether they thought immigration was a
132
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problem in their countries, and specific questions that included issues such as their
feelings on immigrants’ exploitation of social welfare, increased unemployinent,
delinquency and violence, problems as neighbors, and unsuccessful mixed marriages.
The findings of the survey indicated that respondents who seemed to be more xenophobic
were less supportive of European integration. It also found that those who seemed to be
more supportive of European integration were less xenophobic, thus concluding that
xenophobia directly correlates with the support of Europeans towards the integration of
136

Europe.

Although xenophobia can also be applied to immigrants from Eastern

European countries regai'ding the full integration of the former Soviet-bloc nations, it is
especially applicable to Turkey’s case. Alongside xenophobia as an important part of the
reason for many Europeans’ opposition to Turkey’s EU accession, world events have
significantly influenced Europeans’ perceptions towards the presence of Muslims in the
EU.
The rise of the fear of terrorism from fundamentalist Muslim groups within
Europe such as cil-Qoeda and the Hizb iit-Tahrir since the terrorist attacks of 9/11 has
contributed to Europeans’ fears of the repercussions of despondent Muslim immigrants
within their nations. These terrorist groups target dispirited Muslim immigrant youth
who feel as if they are on the outside because of the discrimination and separation they
have experienced, giving them a purpose and a sense of belonging. It is the violence that
these groups teach and force these youths to take part in that the international world is
familiar with and that creates stereotypes against Muslim immigrants that actually only
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apply to a small faction.

The rising awareness of the dangers of such groups in

Europe is apparent in British home secretary John Reid’s public statement to Muslim
parents in 2006 that they must guard their children from becoming brainwashed by such
I3S

groups,

Muslims have also noticed a difference in European attitudes towards them

since the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the gravity of the situation became a reality. One
Belgian woman was even quoted in the New York Times, stating that she now hesitates to
tell people that she is married to a Muslim immigrant, whereas before she was very eager
139

to tell people. She is fearful of the negative responses she might receive,

Because

many Europeans negatively view Muslims as potential terrorists, their perceptions
towards Turkey and the implications of having a large, predominantly Muslim coimtry

as

a part of the EU remain distorted.

CONCLUSIONS:

There are many different ways in which Europe can deal with this new influx of
Muslim immigrants that could result in better relations between Europeans and Muslims,
and therefore with Turkey, that have been brought to the forefront and discussed
throughout Europe. One opinion regarding Muslim immigration involves European
governments aiding these immigrants in assimilating into the culture of the European
country that they have chosen to be their new home. The problem with assimilation is
that it “places the burden on the politically dominated and culturally inferior group,” and
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shows a “dualistic philosophy” in which there are two distinct and separated groups,
with the “inferior” group being the one to change in order to fit within the superior
140

group.

It is this European prejudice towards these immigrants and insistence that they

are “different” and “culturally inferior” that cause them to be referred to as ‘Muslims in
141

Europe” instead of “European Muslims.
Another opinion regarding how to ameliorate the situation between Europeans
and Muslim immigrants is to integrate them into European society, not by forcing them to
forget their culture and traditions and comply with European culture, but by both sides
coming together and making compromises that will result in better relations between
Muslim immigrants and their European counterparts. Although Europeans like to think
that they are a liberal, accepting, multicultural society, those beliefs cannot be truly
legitimate if Europeans refuse to make some concessions regarding their acceptance of
Islam into their society, resulting in the EU’s acceptance of Turkey as a member state.
The debate over Turkey’s EU accession is a long and complicated one that goes
as
much deeper than the socio-economic/political disparities between Turkey and the EU
traditionally cited by the EU as reasons why Turkey cannot become a member. They
involve deeper issues that are not so easily voiced by the EU but that exist just the same.
The common thread running through all of these cultural reasons for opposition is the
religious factor. The fact that the numbers of Muslims present in Europe have tripled and
quadmpled in the past few decades, as well as the rise of crime rates and poverty amongst
those numbers has not helped the image of Islam amongst Europeans. It seems only
natural that Europeans would think of the more negative aspects of the Muslim
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immigrants that they come into contact with on a daily basis when they think of the
prospect of Turkey becoming a member of the EU,and thus, in a sense, becoming
“European." However, the reality is that if Europe wants to tmly set an example for
tolerance for the rest of the world and tmly become multicultural, it must make
concessions and do the best it can not only to integrate the Muslim immigrants, but to
also accept Turkey for what it is: a secular democracy with the main difference from
Europe being the existence of Islam as tlie dominant religion amongst its citizens.
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CONCLUSION:

It is apparent that the European identity crisis and growing presence of Islam in
Europe via Muslim immigrants have had a significant effect on European attitudes
towards Turkey's EU accession. This is especially tme in France, where these attitudes
have been reflected in the media and where the shift in type of opposition has occurred
almost simultaneously as the shift to the Right in French politics. In the media, the
editorials published in the conservative Le Figaro opposed Turkey on the grounds of
cultural differences began in 1997 and strengthened during the following years. This
trend reflected the growing conservative movement and showed that a shift in type of
opposition was taking place. The editorials of the more liberal Le Monde reflected
conservative sentiments around key events, and in later years discounted them while
arguing in favor of Turkey. Thus, the fact that a change in type of opposition had taken
place was acknowledged.
Through the debates surrounding Turkey’s EU accession, the ambiguity of
Turkey’s identity as ‘European’ or the ‘other’ has brought to the surface the fact that
there is no EU-wide accepted definition of what it is to be ‘European.’ This has caused a
sort of identity crisis to occur within Europe. The chapter on European identity offered
many ways in which the European identity has traditionally been defined: Christianity,
common history, geography, liberal democracy, human rights, etc. It is to these
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definitive factors that conservative Europeans cling when attempting to distinguish
themselves from Turkey. However, as the last several hundred years of history can attest
(the Crusades, World Wars 1 and II, Capitalism vs. Communism,the Holocaust), the
factors that conservative Europeans believe fundamentally separate them from Turkey are
unable to withstand the tests of time. It is this realization, and the uncertainty of what lies
in the future of the European identity, tliat lies at the heart of the debate surrounding
Turkey’s EU accession.
The fact of the matter is that conservative Europeans greatly fear the growing
reality that is a multicultural Europe and its implications on what they believe to be the
European identity. Xenophobia, as some would call it, has caused conservative
Europeans to barricade themselves from a society that is rapidly transforming around
them. This has caused them to become more racist and close-minded. It is these types of
attitudes that have prevented Muslim immigrants from being able to successfully
integrate into the European societies that they now call home, and have even pushed them
into radical Islam in order to feel a sense of belonging. The resulting violence and
ten'orism has caused conservative Europeans to become even more introverted and racist.
These attitudes towards the Muslim immigrants that Europeans come into contact with on
a daily basis have been directed towards Turkey because its citizens are predominantly
Muslim and conservative Europeans fear the repercussions of an influx of Turkish
Muslim immigrants into Europe.
From all of this, it can be suggested that although on the surface it appears that a
shift in type of opposition has taken place, the oppositions towards Turkey that fall under
the category of culture, and that have only in recent years begun to take hold, have

70

always been present. Because Turkey’s dossier as an EU candidate is continuously
shrinking as it meets more and more of the Copenhagen Criteria, Europeans are
beginning to have to grapple around for other reasons that could prevent Turkey from
becoming a part of Europe. It is this growing lack of failures to meet the Copenhagen
Criteria that has caused conservative Europeans to cling to the remaining oppositions,
even if some fall under the category of discriminatory and all are unfit for print in the
official literature of the European Union.
The growing reality of the probability of Turkey eventually joining the European
Union and the crisis of identity that this has caused has only helped to strengthen the
cultural factors that have long been in the background of the opposition towards Turkey
becoming an official member. The same is true of the growing anxieties among
Europeans as a result of the presence of Islam within their societies. The violence and
poverty that has unfortunately come to be associated with Muslim immigrants in Europe
in recent years has caused Europeans to become more conservative and equate Islam with
evil. These opinions have, as a result, been applied to Turkey because its citizens are
predominantly Muslim. The violent actions of these socially suffocated Muslim
immigrants have only made Europeans become more conservative and have therefore
caused larger numbers to stand behind oppositions towards Turkey that some could label
as ‘discriminatory,’ which makes them legitimate in the eyes of conservative Europeans.
The media in France has further strengthened the conservative force behind these cultinal
oppositions by way of editorials that were written throughout the time period of Turkey’s
attempts at complying with the Copenhagen Criteria and gaining status as official EU
candidate. The conservative movement within France was strengthened by the content of
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these editorials, and reflected the rise of conservative opposition towards Turkey in
the form of objections based on cultural differences.
What can be taken from this is that Europeans need to come to terms with the
reality that identities are constantly changing and shifting, and that theirs is becoming one
that includes a Muslim faction, whether or not Turkey is admitted into the EU. One
aspect of their identity in which Europeans have always taken pride is the belief that their
society is one with open-minded, liberal values. However, the refusal to welcome Turkey
into the European Union goes against this belief because most of the opposition is based
on factors that are very conservative and close-minded. Europe has also always taken
pride in their belief that they are a leader of advancement in science, philosophy. If
Europeans put aside their prejudices and allow Turkey to become a member of the EU,
they can again be the example for the rest of the world of tolerance and acceptance of
those with different beliefs and customs. If this can be accomplished, then it can be a
start towards ameliorating the relations between the East and West, and Samuel
Huntington's ‘Clash of Civilizations’ thesis can be disproved once and for all.
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Appendix A.

EU 25
Belgium
Czech Republic
Denmark
Germany
Estonia
Greece
Spain
France
Ireland
Italy
Republic of Cyprus
Latvia - LV
Lithuania - LT
Luxembourg
Hungary
Malta
Netherlands
Austria
Poland
Portugal
Slovenia
Slovakia
Finland
Sweden
United Kingdom
Area not controlled by the
gov’t of the Republic of
Cyprus
Bulgaria
Croatia
Romania
Turkey

The cultural
differences
between Turkey
and the EU
Member States
are too
significant to
allow for tills
accession
55%
62%
60%
58%
71%
65%
73%
42%
63%
42%
56%
66%
58%
53%
71%
48%
49%
46%
78%
43%
48%
53%
57%
61%
51%
40%

64%
48%
42%
25%
46%

Source: Eurobarometer #64. June 2005. Page 140. www.europa.eu
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